UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED

TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE

CHAPTER 41--CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

SUBCHAPTER V--DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

 

        .  No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.       

 

Current through P.L. 107-48, approved 10-12-01

 

 

§  1692a. Definitions

 

 

 

 As used in this subchapter--

 

  (1) The term "Commission" means the Federal Trade Commission.

 

  (2) The term "communication" means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.

 

  (3) The term "consumer" means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.

 

  (4) The term "creditor" means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in  default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.

 

  (5) The term "debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.

 

  (6) The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.  Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.  For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.  The term does not include--

 

   (A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the   creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;

 

   (B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;

 

   (C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;

 

   (D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;

 

   (E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors;  and

 

   (F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement;  (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by   such person;  or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.

 

  (7) The term "location information" means a consumer's place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment.

 

  (8) The term "State" means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.

 

 

 

CREDIT(S)

 

1997 Main Volume

 

 

(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VIII, §  803, as added Pub.L. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 875, and amended Pub.L. 99-361, July 9, 1986, 100 Stat. 768.)

 

 

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

 

 

 

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

 

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

 

 

 1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1962.

 

 

 1977 Acts. Senate Report No. 95-382, see 1977 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1695.

 

 

 1986 Acts. House Report No. 99-405, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1752.

 

 

Amendments

 

 

 1986 Amendments. Par. (6).  Pub.L. 99-361 in provision preceding subpar.  (A) substituted "clause (F)" for "clause (G)", in subpar. (E) inserted "and" after "creditor;", struck out subpar. (F), which excluded from the term "debt collector" any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client, and redesignated subpar. (G) as (F).

 

 

 

 

CROSS REFERENCES

 

Private counsel as debt collector, see 31 USCA §  3718
(6) Notwithstanding the fourth sentence of section 803(6) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692a(6)), a private counsel performing legal services pursuant to a contract made under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be considered to be a debt collector for the purposes of such Act. .

 

 

AMERICAN LAW REPORTS

 

 

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes prohibiting abusive or coercive debt collection practices.  87 ALR3d 786.

 

What constitutes "debt" for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act  (15 U.S.C.A. §  1692A(5)).  159 ALR Fed 121.

 

What constitutes "debt" and "debt collector" for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C.A. §  1692(a)(5), (6)).  62 ALR Fed 552.

 

 

LIBRARY REFERENCES

 

Administrative Law

 

 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, scope and coverage, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3512.

 

Limitations on communications, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3514.

 

 

Encyclopedias

 

 

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Consumer and Borrower Protection § §  194, 197-199,201, 202

 

 

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

 

 

Acceleration notices and demand letters.  Manuel H. Newburger, 47 Consumer Fin.L.Q.Rep. 338 (1993).

 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:  Attorneys beware, you too may be a debt collector.  Janet Flaccus, 1987 Ark.L.Notes 11.

 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:  Emerging source of liability for attorneys.  Christopher A. Golden, 69 N.Y.St.B.J. 14 (Feb. 1997).

 

Guidelines for consumer debt collection by attorneys under the 1986 Amendment to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Michael K. Sweig, 21 New Eng.L.Rev. 697 (1985-86).

 

 

Texts and Treatises

 

 

Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § §  41.3, 61.4, 61.7  (Robert L. Haig ed.) (West Group & ABA 1998).

 

 7 Fed. Proc. L Ed Consumer Credit Protection § §  15:67, 68, 76

 

 

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

Agricultural loans 8

   Attorneys 13

Bail bondsmen, debt collector 16a

Business transactions 4

Checks, debt 4a

Child support 5

Civil damages 11

Collection and servicing agencies 14

Communication 1

Consumer 2

Corporate entities 20

Creditors, debt collector 14a

Debt 3-11

                Debt - Generally 3

                Debt - Agricultural loans 8

                Debt - Banks and banking 10

                Debt - Business transactions 4

                Debt - Checks 4a

                Debt - Child support 5

                Debt - Civil damages 11

                Debt - Divorce actions 5a

                Debt - Friendly loans 6

                Debt - Housing assessments 7

                Debt - Tax levy 9

                Debt - Theft 11a

Debt collector 12-23

                Debt collector - Generally 12

                Debt collector - Attorneys 13

                Debt collector - Bail bondsmen 16a

                Debt collector - Banks and banking 15

                Debt collector - Collection and servicing agencies 14

                Debt collector - Corporate entities 20

                Debt collector - Creditors 14a

                Debt collector - Employees 21  

                Debt collector - Financing companies 16

                Debt collector - Guaranty agencies 19

                Debt collector - Insurers 18

                Debt collector - Judicial entities 23

                Debt collector - Media 22

                Debt collector - Mortgagees 17

                Debt collector - Repossessors 23a

                Debt collector - Service providers 23b

Divorce actions, debt 5a

Employees 21

Financing companies 16

Friendly loans 6

Guaranty agencies 19

Housing assessments 7

Insurers 18

Judicial entities 23

Media 22

Mortgagees 17

Official duties 24

Repossessors, debt collector 23a

Service providers, debt collector 23b

   Tax levy 9

Theft, debt 11a

Transactions 25

  

 1. Communication

 

 

 Notice demanding payment of rent arrearage or surrender of rented premises to landlord was "communication" to collect debt, within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, S.D.N.Y.1997, 988 F.Supp. 712, affirmed 163 F.3d 111.

 

 

 Collection bureau's notices to debtor qualified as "communications" in connection with the collection of a debt under this section.  In re Scrimpsher, Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1982, 17 B.R. 999.

 

 

 2. Consumer

 

 

 Customers of long-distance telephone services provider were not  "consumers," within meaning of disclosure requirement of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) that provider allegedly violated when it failed to notify customers in their telephone bill that it was assisting in collection of debt owed by customers' daughter-in-law to provider's former subsidiary or affiliate, given that customers were not obligated to pay daughter-in-law's debt.  Conboy v. AT & T Corp., S.D.N.Y.2000, 84 F.Supp.2d 492.

 

 

 Debtor, as natural person who was obligated to pay debt to hospital for services provided in connection with her kidney infection, was "consumer" within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Creighton v. Emporia Credit Service, Inc., E.D.Va.1997, 981 F.Supp. 411.

 

 

 Patient who had received medical services on credit, and who was primarily responsible for payment of account at medical center, qualified as "consumer" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, E.D.Pa.1996, 926 F.Supp. 521.

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, establishing liability of debt collector who fails to comply with the Act "with respect to any person," does not limit recovery to "consumers," and thus would not preclude recovery by person to whom debt collector sent letter seeking to collect debt of such person's deceased father even if such person were not a consumer;  but, in any event, such person was a "consumer" when collectors admittedly demanded payment of debt from him.  Dutton v. Wolhar, D.Del.1992, 809 F.Supp. 1130.

 

 

 3. Debt--Generally

 

 

 Unpaid administrative and other fees charged under rental agreement by automobile and truck rental company in event of accident constituted "debt" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., C.A.11 (Fla.) 1997, 119 F.3d 922.

 

 

 First requisite element of debt under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act  (FDCPA) is existence of obligation.  Ernst v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., M.D.La.1997, 964 F.Supp. 213.

 

 

 "Debt," under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), is transaction in which consumer is offered or extended the right to acquire money, property, insurance or services which are primarily for household purposes and to defer payment.  Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, E.D.Pa.1996, 926 F.Supp. 521.

 

 

 Filing of proof of claim in bankruptcy, even for debt whose amount is disputed, does not trigger the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  In re Cooper, Bkrtcy.N.D.Fla.2000, 253 B.R. 286.

 

 

 Collection agency was not prohibited by this subchapter from recovering a percentage of the amount due for collection costs where such amounts were expressly authorized by agreements creating the debts.  Grant Road Lumber Co., Inc. v. Wystrach, Ariz.App.1984, 682 P.2d 1146, 140 Ariz. 479.

 

 

 4. ---- Business transactions

 

 

 Dishonored check written in payment for consumer goods created "debt" within purview of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Snow v.Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., C.A.10 (Utah) 1998, 143 F.3d 1350.

 

 

 District court properly dismissed guarantor's state and federal consumer debt collection claims against owner of loan and guaranty, even though guarantor claimed that, because owner was not first owner of loan and guaranty, owner was engaging in collection of debt for another;  guarantor's obligation, which arose out of commercial transaction, did not constitute a "debt" under either Federal Fair Debt Collection Act or Texas Debt Collection Act.  First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Smith, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1995, 62 F.3d 133, rehearing denied.

 

 

 Purchase of credit card processing unit was not transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and, thus, obligation arising from such purchase did not constitute "debt" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Holman v. West Valley Collection Services, Inc., D.Minn.1999, 60 F.Supp.2d 935.

 

 

 Debtor's obligation to pay automobile liability insurance premiums was  "debt" within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), even though debtor was compelled by state law to obtain such insurance and even though obligation benefited others in addition to debtor.  Kahn v. Rowley, M.D.La.1997, 968 F.Supp. 1095.

 

 

 Neither federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) nor Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (DCPA) applied to leases for security equipment obtained and installed by lessees in their family-owned and operated stores, inasmuch as Acts applied to debts arising out of consumer transactions for personal, family, or household purposes, and lessees used equipment for business purposes, even though equipment was intended to provide security to family members working at stores.  Garza v. Bancorp Group, Inc., S.D.Tex.1996, 955 F.Supp. 68.

 

 

 Notes used to pay for a portion of investor's partnership interest in tax- shelter limited partnership were not a "debt" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Hartel, S.D.N.Y.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1139.

 

 

 Collection of purely business-related debt was not governed by Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Bank of Boston Intern. of Miami v. Arguello Tefel, E.D.N.Y.1986, 644 F.Supp. 1423.

 

 

 Debt incurred purely for business reasons is not covered by Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Mendez v. Apple Bank for Sav., N.Y.City Civ.Ct.1989, 541 N.Y.S.2d 920, 143 Misc.2d 915.

 

 

 4A. ---- Checks

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's (FDCPA) broad definition of "debt" as any obligation to pay arising from consumer transaction applied to dishonored checks, given that check issuers' payment obligations arose from transactions for personal or household goods; thus, check issuers stated claims under FDCPA when they alleged that attorney and company attempting to collect payment on dishonored checks violated FDCPA.  Duffy v. Landberg, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1998, 133 F.3d 1120,rehearing denied, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 62, 525 U.S. 821, 142 L.Ed.2d 49.

 

 

 Check writer stated claim when she alleged that check collection agency, attorney, and law firm violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in attempting to collect dishonored check, inasmuch as dishonored check was debt under FDCPA.  Charles v. Lundgren & Associates, P.C., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1997, 119 F.3d 739, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 627, 522 U.S. 1028, 139 L.Ed.2d 607, on remand.

 

 

 5. ---- Child support

 

 

 Child support payments are not "debts" encompassed within scope of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Mabe v. G.C. Services Ltd. Partnership, C.A.4 (Va.) 1994, 32 F.3d 86.

 

 

 Former husband's child support obligation was not debt arising out of transaction with subject primarily of "personal, family, or household purposes," within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Act, and thus, former husband's child support payments were not "debts" protected by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act;  former husband could not point to any money, property, insurance, or services he received in connection with the child support obligations.  Brown v. Child Support Advocates, D.Utah 1994, 878 F.Supp. 1451.

 

 

 5A. ---- Divorce actions

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was not applicable to law firm's efforts to enforce property settlement obligations imposed by divorce decree; obligations, though based on negotiated marital termination agreement, did not arise from consumer transaction, and thus were not "debts," within meaning of Act.  Hicken v. Arnold, Anderson & Dove, P.L.L.P., D.Minn.2001, 137 F.Supp.2d 1141.

 

 

 6. ---- Friendly loans

 

 

 Loan between friends made so that debtor could invest in software company was  "business loan," not "consumer debt," and, thus, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act did not apply;  debtor's intended use of funds could not be characterized as "primarily for personal, family or household purposes."  Bloom v. I.C. System, Inc., C.A.9 (Or.) 1992, 972 F.2d 1067.

 

 

 Personal loan between friends which was used by borrower as venture capital investment was not loan "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes" and was thus not subject to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), regardless of intent of lender.  Bloom v. I.C. System, Inc., D.Or.1990, 753 F.Supp. 314,affirmed 972 F.2d 1067.

 

 

 7. ---- Housing assessments

 

 

 Homeowners' obligations to municipalities for water and sewer charges were  "debts" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), even though no extension of credit had occurred, and obligations retained that status after they were assigned.  Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., C.A.3 (Pa.) 2000, 225 F.3d 379.

 

 

 An assessment owed to a condominium association qualified as a "debt," within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), even though the assessment did not involve an extension of credit; debtor became obligated upon purchasing his condominium unit to pay any assessments pursuant to the governing documents of his association and state statute, such that assessment qualified as an obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a "transaction," and while the assessment was used to maintain and repair the common area, it nevertheless had a primarily personal, family, or household purpose.  Ladick v. Van Gemert, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1998, 146 F.3d 1205,certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 511, 525 U.S. 1002, 142 L.Ed.2d 424.

 

 

 Past-due assessments owed by condominium owners and homeowners to respective homeowner associations qualified as obligations of consumer to pay money arising out of transaction, thereby satisfying transaction element of "debt" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), given that obligation topay derived from purchase transaction itself, even though timing and amount of particular assessments was yet to be determined.  Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Ltd., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1997, 119 F.3d 477, rehearing denied.

 

 

 Homeowner association fees for maintenance and improvement of common areas within housing development were service primarily for personal, family, and household purposes within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), even though many households used or benefited from common areas. Thies v. Law Offices of William A. Wyman, S.D.Cal.1997, 969 F.Supp. 604.

 

 

 Condominium fees are not "debts" for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, since they do not include extension of credit and operate to provide communal goods and services which only indirectly benefit payer. Riter v. Moss & Bloomberg, Ltd., N.D.Ill.1996, 932 F.Supp. 210, reversed 119 F.3d 477, rehearing denied.

 

 

 Assessment against homeowner by subdivision for maintaining private road did not arise out of transaction which was primarily for personal, family, or household purchases, and was not "debt," under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Nance v. Petty, Livingston, Dawson, & Devening, W.D.Va.1994, 881 F.Supp. 223.

 

 

 Debt arising out of transaction involving vacation time-share for debtor and her family was for personal or family purposes, within meaning of definition of "debt" in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and, therefore, debtor qualified as "consumer" under FDCPA.  Herbert v. Monterey Financial Services, Inc., D.Conn.1994, 863 F.Supp. 76.

 

 

 8. ---- Agricultural loans

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practice Act did not apply to transaction involving a loan for agricultural purposes of $118,000 as debt was not incurred for personal, family or household purposes, and lenders were not attempting to collect another's debt under statute.  Munk v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1986, 791 F.2d 130.

 

 

 9. ---- Tax levy

 

 

 Personal property taxes levied by town upon plaintiffs' automobiles were not  "debts" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and therefore, debt collection service's efforts to collect those taxes from plaintiffs were not covered by Act; there was no "transaction," as contemplated by Act.  Beggs v. Rossi, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1998, 145 F.3d 511.

 

 

 Per capita tax levied by a Pennsylvania taxing district was not a "debt" encompassed within the scope of this section.  Staub v. Harris, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1980, 626 F.2d 275.

 

 

 Personal property taxes assessed on motor vehicles were not "debts," for purposes of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Beggs v. Rossi, D.Conn.1997, 994 F.Supp. 114, affirmed 145 F.3d 511.

 

 

 10. ---- Banks and banking

 

 

 "ComputerGram" sent by creditor-hospital to debtor was not communication from debt collector and, thus, was not subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which does not apply to creditors who attempt to collect their own debts in their own name; although hospital used collection agency as mailing service, return address and telephone number indicated that communication was from hospital, and text thanked debtor for choosing hospital and invited him to telephone hospital regarding unpaid bill.  Powell v. Computer Credit, Inc., S.D.Ohio 1997, 975 F.Supp. 1034, affirmed.

 

 

 Sum allegedly owed to bank by bank customers was not "debt" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), absent any allegation that sum arose from any transaction with bank;  bank merely requested customers return $18,000 mistakenly credited to their account.  Arnold v. Truemper, N.D.Ill.1993, 833 F.Supp. 678.

 

 

 Where debtor's "debt" arose from several purchases of food paid by personal checks, collection bureau's activities concerning collection of debtor's outstanding dishonored checks involved collection of a "debt" under this subchapter, despite argument that dishonored checks represented debts separate and distinct from debt associated with debtor's consumer purchase of food. In re Scrimpsher, Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1982, 17 B.R. 999.

 

 

 11. ---- Civil damages

 

 

 Customer's supposed liability under Ohio statute for civil damages arising out of his alleged theft or attempted theft of cigars was not "debt" incurred by "consumer" in transaction which was "primarily for personal, family or household purposes," within meaning of federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);  accordingly, customer could not recover from merchant for failing to give notices required under the FDCPA in attempting to enforce its civil damages claim.  Shorts v. Palmer, S.D.Ohio 1994, 155 F.R.D. 172.

 

 

 11A. ---- Theft

 

 

 Claim arising out of alleged theft does not constitute a "debt" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);  while thief undoubtedly has obligation to pay for goods or services he steals, the FDCPA limits its reach to those obligations to pay arising from consensual transactions, where parties negotiate or contract for consumer-related goods or services.  Coretti v. Lefkowitz, D.Conn.1997, 965 F.Supp. 3.

 

 

 12. Debt collector--Generally

 

 

 Radiologist who signed physician's lien in attempt to collect debt from former clinic patient was not "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); radiologist was not in business of collecting debts, and in any event came within FDCPA exceptions for persons acting in capacity of officers or employees of creditors and for limited partners in limited partnerships collecting debts owed to partnerships.  Kang v. Eisenstein, N.D.Ill.1997, 962 F.Supp. 112.

 

 

 Under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, "debt collector" includes person in business, the principal purpose of which is collection of debts, person who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due another, and creditors who, in the process of collecting their own debts, use any names which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.  Kempf v. Famous Barr Co., E.D.Mo.1988, 676 F.Supp. 937.

 

 

 "Debt collectors" covered by this section are those who regularly collect for others and not creditors of consumers even though debt is created between consumer and third person and subsequently assigned to a creditor such as a finance company if such assignment is made before default.  Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corp., N.D.Miss.1978, 454 F.Supp. 937.

 

 

 Collection bureau's minimal conduct of beckoning debtor to send payment to food store creditor qualified it to be a "debt collector" under this subchapter because it used the mails in a business the principal purpose of which was the collection of debts or regularly collected or attempted to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.  In re Scrimpsher, Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1982, 17 B.R. 999.

 

 

 13. ---- Attorneys

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applied to lawyer regularly engaged in consumer debt-collection litigation on behalf of creditor client.  Heintz v. Jenkins, U.S.Ill.1995, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 514 U.S. 291, 131 L.Ed.2d 395.

 

 

 Under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), relevant time for determining character of debt was when debt arose, and therefore FDCPA applied to law firms' attempts to collect mortgage debt for house in which mortgagor initially resided, even though, at time debt collection efforts began, mortgagor was renting premises to strangers and thus was making business use of property.  Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2000, 214 F.3d 872.

 

 

 Consumers failed to prove that creditor's law firm and attorney employed by firm "regularly collected debts" so as to constitute "debt collectors" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where district court found that only two percent of law firm's overall practices consisted of debt collection cases, that firm did not employ individuals full-time for the purpose of collecting debts, that only 7.4%, 29 of 389 cases annually, of attorney's overall practice consisted of debt collection cases, and that he represented debtors in the majority of his debt collection cases.  Schroyer v. Frankel, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1999, 197 F.3d 1170.

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) exception for a "person while serving or attempting to serve legal process" in connection with judicial enforcement of a debt did not exempt law firm from FDCPA, with respect to three-day rent demand notice sent on landlord's behalf, as required by New York law as condition precedent to summary eviction proceeding, and attorneys thus qualified as "debt collectors" for FDCPA purposes.  Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1998, 163 F.3d 111.

 

 

 Attorneys engaged in litigation were "debt collectors" subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) where they filed lawsuits on behalf of client to collect debts allegedly owed by consumers.  Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1996, 76 F.3d 103.

 

 

 If allegation of complaint that attorney and law firm "were regularly engaged for profit in collection of debts allegedly owed by consumers" were true, attorney and law firm fell within statutory definition of "debt collector" in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Jenkins v. Heintz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 25 F.3d 536, certiorari granted 115 S.Ct. 416, 513 U.S. 959, 130 L.Ed.2d 332,affirmed 115 S.Ct. 1489, 514 U.S. 291, 131 L.Ed.2d 395, .

 

 

 Attorney whose practice was at least 80% in area of debt collection fell within definition of "debt collector" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and fact that attorney's filing of application for writ of garnishment was pure legal action did not alter this conclusion because attorney exemption was no longer part of FDCPA.  Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 15 F.3d 1507.

 

 

 Attorney retained by banks to represent bank card divisions in lawsuits based on delinquent credit card accounts was "debt collector" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, despite contention that attorney performed only legal work, since at least 70% of attorney's legal fees were generated from collection of debts, "principal purpose" of work was collection of debt, and filing of warrants constituted "indirect" means of debt collection.  Scott v. Jones, C.A.4 (Va.) 1992, 964 F.2d 314.

 

 

 Attorney who regularly engaged in debt collection activities on behalf of clients was "debt collector" subject to requirements of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act;  attorney was not mere agent of creditor where collection letters attorney sent to debtors unequivocally stated that monies were to be sent to him directly.  Crossley v. Lieberman, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 868 F.2d 566.

 

 

 Investigation by Federal Trade Commission into attorney's practice, most of which was devoted to collecting debts, was not outside its authority under this subchapter despite exclusion of "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client" from statutory definition of "debt collectors."  F. T. C. v. Shaffner, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1980, 626 F.2d 32.

 

 

 Attorney for law firm which represented collection agency was "debt collector" and, thus, could be held personally liable under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), even though law firm was limited liability company, where attorney was firm's sole attorney, developed debt collection practices, was author of generic collection letters utilized by firm and supervised all of firm's collection activities.  Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., Inc., D.Utah 1997, 973 F.Supp. 1320.

 

 

 Attorney whose shared office and telephone system with debt collection agency, and who authorized agency to send dunning letter to debtor, was not liable under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for agency employees' conversations with debtor's wife, given complete lack of evidence that attorney participated in, or even sanctioned, any communication with wife.  Bitah v. Global Collection Services, Inc., D.N.M.1997, 968 F.Supp. 618.

 

 

 Law firm that was hired by mortgagee to collect note and mortgage debt through correspondence or legal proceedings was "debt collector" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where law firm sent letter advising mortgagors of payoff figure and reinstatement figure for mortgage and directed mortgagors to pay law firm, not creditor.  Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, M.D.Fla.1996, 919 F.Supp. 1564.

 

 

 Attorneys retained by debt collection agency to collect delinquent debts qualified as "debt collectors" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) notwithstanding that, in threatening legal action unless delinquent checks were paid, attorneys were acting in their professional capacity as attorneys.  Newman v. Checkrite California, Inc., E.D.Cal.1995, 912 F.Supp. 1354.

 

 

 "Debt collectors" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) include attorneys whose principal business is debt collection or who regularly collect debts of another.  Blakemore v. Pekay, N.D.Ill.1995, 895 F.Supp. 972.

 

 

 Law firm and its partner were not "debt collectors," under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where debt collecting cases made up only .61 percent of partner's practice and only 1.07 percent of firm's cases over 18- month period.  Nance v. Petty, Livingston, Dawson, & Devening, W.D.Va.1994, 881 F.Supp. 223.

 

 

 Attorney's uncorroborated denial of other debt collection activity did not warrant dismissal of debtor's complaint for violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) based on claim that attorney was not "debt collector." Sluys v. Hand, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 321.

 

 

 Attorneys who were representing creditor in connection with debt collection efforts, but who did not send demand letter to debtors, and merely accommodated debtors by providing information they requested regarding reinstatement of mortgage to avoid foreclosure, did not act as "debt collectors" subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Williams v. Trott, E.D.Mich.1993, 822 F.Supp. 1266.

 

 

 Attorney who regularly filed legal actions for purpose of collecting debts on behalf of client was not "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Green v. Hocking, E.D.Mich.1992, 792 F.Supp. 1064,affirmed 9 F.3d 18.

 

 

 Law firm was a person who "regularly" collected debts for purposes of Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, even though firm's collection business was less than 4% of its total business;  law firm had ongoing relationship with corporate client with presumably many overdue accounts on its books. Stojanovski v. Strobl and Manoogian, P.C., E.D.Mich.1992, 783 F.Supp. 319.

 

 

 Attorney regularly collected debts and was "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, even though debt collection did not form principal part of his practice;  attorney filed 144 small claims suits in collection matters in 1986 and 1987 alone, collection letter in question had been used 125 to 150 times in 14 months, and more than 60% of attorney's work for credit union involved collection matters.  Cacace v. Lucas, D.Conn.1990, 775 F.Supp. 502.

 

 

 In-house attorney's use of word processor form to draft letter to consumer buyer did not establish that attorney regularly collected or attempted to collect seller's debts and that attorney was debt collector;  nothing indicated frequency with which form letter with same letterhead was used as basis for attempting to collect debts on behalf of seller.  Dorsey v. Morgan, D.Md.1991, 760 F.Supp. 509.

 

 

 A law firm could not be deemed to be a "debt collector," as defined by Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, with respect to its representation of a surety in actions brought by surety to compel partnership investors, who were in default on promissory notes, to comply with indemnification agreements;  thus, Act's venue provisions were inapplicable.  Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Keating, S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1137.

 

 

 Law firm that engaged in activities of purely legal nature in seeking reimbursement for guarantor of notes executed by investor in tax-shelter limited partnership was not a "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Hartel, S.D.N.Y.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1139.

 

 

 Attorney did not regularly collect or attempt to collect debts of another and, therefore, was not "debt collector" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; attorney averaged less than two collection matters per year, and debt collection comprised less than one percent of his practice.  Mertes v. Devitt, W.D.Wis.1990, 734 F.Supp. 872.

 

 

 Letter sent in attempt to collect debt is exempt from Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as letter by attorney collecting debt on behalf of client, and complies with canons of ethics, where matter was referred to attorney and attorney was authorized to represent individual debtor, not collection agency, with respect to each matter.  U.S. v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., N.D.Tex.1986, 667 F.Supp. 370, affirmed as modified on other grounds 823 F.2d 880.

 

 

 Attorney alleged to have filed complaint and received payments which plaintiff made under judgment was within exception granted by this section, where attorney was not present in closed room, or even in district judge's office in which plaintiff alleged he was threatened and coerced into signing agreement admitting liability and agreeing to pay debt in full, and nothing was alleged in complaint which would link attorney with any alleged violations of plaintiff's rights.  Horne v. Farrell, M.D.Pa.1983, 560 F.Supp. 219.

 

 

 Commission did not exceed authority by issuing civil investigative demand requiring law firm to provide certain information about its debt collection activities under this subchapter to determine whether law firm was acting "as an attorney" within meaning of exemption in subsec. (6) (F) of this section for attorneys collecting debt as an attorney on behalf of and in name of client where, while exclusion was not a narrow one, Congress did not tend to vest every attorney with right to be free from investigation and Congress did not intend to shield one debt collection business from investigation simply because it was owned by attorney.  XYZ Law Firm v. F. T. C., N.D.Ga.1981, 525 F.Supp. 1235.

 

 

 No liability could be imposed under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) upon law firm which had no involvement in alleged debt collection activity, but which merely appeared in defense of parties accused of violating the FDCPA.  In re Cooper, Bkrtcy.N.D.Fla.2000, 253 B.R. 286.

 

 

 Creditor's counsel was "debt collector," within meaning of federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, though he had represented debtors as well as creditors in the past, where he had represented creditor in issue for ten years and was counsel for other loan companies and collection agencies.  In re Littles, Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1988, 90 B.R. 669,affirmed as modified on other grounds 90 B.R. 682, affirmed 868 F.2d 566, affirmed as modified on other grounds 90 B.R. 700.

 

 

 "Debt collectors," for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, includes attorneys whose practices are limited to purely legal matters. Shapiro and Meinhold v. Zartman, Colo.1992, 823 P.2d 120.

 

 

 If attorneys regularly engaged in debt collection activities, including foreclosures, they were "debt collectors" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and were subject to its provisions.  Zartman v. Shapiro and Meinhold, Colo.App.1990, 811 P.2d 409, certiorari granted, affirmed 823 P.2d 120.

 

 

 14. ---- Collection and servicing agencies

 

 

 Largest shareholder and president of collection agency was not himself a  "debt collector" under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), regardless of whether he exercised extensive control over agency.  Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditor Bureau, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2000, 211 F.3d 1057, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied.

 

 

 Neither bona fide mortgage servicing company nor its assignee on promissory note for home were debt collectors within meaning of Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, where mortgage servicing company sold the loan two months before purchasers were in default, and, after servicing company sold the loan, it continued to service the loan for its assignee.  Perry v. Stewart Title Co., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 756 F.2d 1197, rehearing granted in part 761 F.2d 237.

 

 

 Printing and mailing service that debt collection agency used to mail collection letter to debtor was not a "debt collector," within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), though advertisements which service mailed to debt collection agencies and other businesses invited these businesses to join in "strategic partnership" with service, and though service's name appeared in upper righthand corner of collection letter; service did not solicit business only from collection agencies, did not write or edit debt collection agency's letters except to the extent it engaged in simple proofreading, was not identified in letter as party seeking to collect debt or as party to whom debtor could respond, and was paid flat rate by collection agency without regard to collection letter's success.  Trull v. Lason Systems, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 982 F.Supp. 600.

 

 

 Illinois long-arm statute covered nonresident president and vice president of California debt collection agency in suit brought by consumers alleging violations of federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) based upon acts of president and vice president in authorizing and directing use of misleading agency name in state of Illinois.  Brujis v. Shaw, N.D.Ill.1995, 876 F.Supp. 975.

 

 

 President and manager of debt collection agency were each "debt collector" who could thus be held jointly and severally liable under Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);  each employee was himself "debt collector" within statutory definition, and each was affirmative actor and tort-feasor, who actually made actionable phone calls.  Teng v. Metropolitan Retail Recovery Inc., E.D.N.Y.1994, 851 F.Supp. 61.

 

 

 Sole general partner of partnership which was engaged primarily in business of providing collection services for partnership and others was "debt collector" for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Cirkot v. Diversified Financial Systems, Inc., D.Conn.1993, 839 F.Supp. 941.

 

 

 Corporation formed for sole purpose of collecting on bankrupt company's accounts receivable was "debt collector," within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, though it was collecting debts for itself, in that it regularly collected debts and debt collection was its principal purpose; moreover, debts collected were already in default when they were assigned to corporation and thus corporation fell within assignee exception to definition of creditor.  Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., M.D.Ala.1987, 668 F.Supp. 1480.

 

 

 Conduct of collection agency after supposed referral of matter to attorney, as distinguished from conduct of attorney, is not exempt from the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and thus, if agency threatens suit after attorney letter has been sent, there is violation.  U.S. v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., N.D.Tex.1986, 667 F.Supp. 370, affirmed as modified on other grounds 823 F.2d 880.

 

 

 This subchapter applies only to consumer collection agencies as opposed to commercial collection agencies, and therefore had no application to suit by commercial collection agency challenging constitutionality of I.C. § §  26-2222 et seq.;  rather, analysis of challenged legislation would proceed on basis that Congress had not addressed question of commercial collection agencies. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. McEldowney, D.C.Idaho 1983, 564 F.Supp. 257.

 

 

 Student loan servicing company to which loans were transferred for servicing prior to student borrower's default did not qualify as "debt collector," within meaning of Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Fischer v. UNIPAC Service Corp., Iowa 1994, 519 N.W.2d 793.

 

 

 14A. ---- Creditors

 

 

 Check authorization service which reimbursed its merchants for dishonored checks that it had authorized was not acting as a "creditor" excluded from requirements of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when it attempted to collect on dishonored items on its own behalf; service was acting as third party collecting debts that were originally owed to its merchants, and upon which it received an assignment if debt was in default.  Winterstein v. CrossCheck, Inc., N.D.Ill.2001, 149 F.Supp.2d 466.

 

 

 Creditor-correspondence school was not "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) merely because it retained its corporate affiliate to collect its debt from student; school and affiliate were distinct entities, and nowhere in complaint did student allege that they were, in reality, single economic entity or that school controlled affiliate's debt collection process.  Harrison v. NBD Inc., E.D.N.Y.1997, 968 F.Supp. 837.

 

 

 15. ---- Banks and banking

 

 

 Bank was not "debt collector" for purpose of customer's claim under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for alleged harassment; although bank employed third party or subsidiary on its behalf to collect on debt, customer alleged that bank was collecting debt owed directly to it and bank's primary purpose was to loan money to consumers, not collection of outstanding debts. Thomasson v. Bank One, Louisiana, N.A., E.D.La.2001, 137 F.Supp.2d 721.

 

 

 Creditor-bank's conduct on its own behalf could not subject it to liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); creditor could not be "debt collector" within meaning of the FDCPA.  KPMG Peat Marwick v. Texas Commerce Bank, S.D.Tex.1997, 976 F.Supp. 623, reconsideration denied.

 

 

 Bank was not rendered "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by bank's contacting police to investigate possible theft by bank customers;  police were not in business with principal purpose of collecting debt, police did not regularly collect debts, and bank did not contact police in order for police to collect debt.  Arnold v. Truemper, N.D.Ill.1993, 833 F.Supp. 678.

 

 

 Computerized check authorization and purchase service, which regularly attempted to collect on dishonored checks purchased from its subscribers, was a "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Holmes v. Telecredit Service Corp., D.Del.1990, 736 F.Supp. 1289.

 

 

 Neither bank that issued credit card nor related service corporation that attempted to collect debt owed on credit card was "debt collector" subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and, therefore, holders of credit card had no claim under Act for alleged improprieties in service corporation's collection attempts.  Meads v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., S.D.Ga.1988, 686 F.Supp. 330.

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is meant to reach only those who regularly collect debts for others and not creditors collecting on their own, and thus, did not apply to bank which attempted to collect debt owed itself.  Mendez v. Apple Bank for Sav., N.Y.City Civ.Ct.1989, 541 N.Y.S.2d 920, 143 Misc.2d 915.

 

 

 Bank's release of information concerning debtor to another bank did not violate federal Privacy Act, since bank was neither "agency" within meaning of Act nor "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Baldwin v. First Nat. Bank of Black Hills, S.D.1985, 362 N.W.2d 85.

 

 

 16. ---- Financing companies

 

 

 Company to which car dealership had assigned its consumers' installment sales contracts for purchase of automobiles was not "debt collector" subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); even if car dealership rather than assignee was consumers' creditor, FDCPA's definition of debt collector specifically excluded persons collecting debt owed to another to the extent that the activity concerned debt that was not in default at time it was obtained by such person, and assignee had been assigned debts before consumers had defaulted.  Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1996, 76 F.3d 103.

 

 

 Automobile finance company was not subject to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) with respect to its direct attempts to insure that debtors made payments which were overdue on loan that company had made to them.  James v. Ford Motor Credit Co., D.Minn.1994, 842 F.Supp. 1202,affirmed 47 F.3d 961.

 

 

 Finance company, which did not collect or attempt to collect debts owed to another but only made collections by its in-house employees under its own name, was not a "debt collector" within meaning of this section and its actions did not constitute violations of the subchapter to give rise to federal question. Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corp., N.D.Miss.1978, 454 F.Supp. 937.

 

 

 Credit company to which automobile installment purchase agreement was assigned for debt servicing qualified as "debt collector," within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Foster v. Ford Motor Credit Co., S.C.1990, 395 S.E.2d 440, 302 S.C. 450.

 

 

 16A. ---- Bail bondsmen

 

 

 Bail bondsman played significant role in originating bail bond transaction, including indemnification agreement and contingent note and mortgage executed by mother seeking bond for incarcerated daughter, and therefore its actions to collect on note were covered by originator exception to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Buckman v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1997, 115 F.3d 892.

 

 

 17. ---- Mortgagees

 

 

 Mortgage company was not "debt collector," within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and thus, mortgagors could not recover against mortgage company for violations of FDCPA for phone call by company's employee to mortgagors after their attorney notified company to deal with him and not mortgagors directly, where company's principal business purpose was to make and service consumer loans, company did not collect any debts owed to any entity other than itself, and branch manager for mortgage company was acting as its employee and on its behalf when he telephoned mortgagors about their loan.  Oldroyd v. Associates Consumer Discount Company/PA, E.D.Pa.1994, 863 F.Supp. 237.

 

 

 18. ---- Insurers

 

 

 Insurer did not qualify as "debt collector" under provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, defining debt collector as any person operating business in interstate commerce "principal purpose of which" is collection of debts, merely because its subrogation department engaged in collection of debts;  department of major corporation could not be viewed as though it were separate and apart from corporation itself.  Vasquez v. Allstate Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1996, 937 F.Supp. 773.

 

 

 Protections of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act [15 U.S.C.A. § §  1692-1692o ] did not apply to action by debtors against insurer alleging that loan and security agreements with insurer were invalid or rescindable, where no involvement by a "debt collector" was alleged.  Jonak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., D.Neb.1985, 629 F.Supp. 90.

 

 

 19. ---- Guaranty agencies

 

 

 Guaranty agency that acquired debtor's student loan after default in order to pursue its collection was subject to Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., C.A.9 (Or.) 1996, 94 F.3d 1260, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2484, 521 U.S. 1106, 138 L.Ed.2d 992,certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2496, 521 U.S. 1111, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003.

 

 

 Guaranty agency that acquired debtor's student loan after default in order to pursue its collection was not government actor exempt from Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); agency was private, nonprofit organization with government contract, not government agency or employee.  Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., C.A.9 (Or.) 1996, 94 F.3d 1260, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2484, 521 U.S. 1106, 138 L.Ed.2d 992,certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2496, 521 U.S. 1111, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003.

 

 

 Private, not-for-profit corporation which operated as guarantee agency participating in a federal guaranteed student loan program was not a "debt collector" under federal Debt Collection Practices Act when it generated and sent notices to student borrower concerning the involuntary interception and application of his federal income tax refund towards repayment of his federally guaranteed student loan.  Games v. Cavazos, D.Del.1990, 737 F.Supp. 1368.

 

 

 Private, nonprofit guaranty agency that was established pursuant to the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), to encourage lenders to make loans available to student-borrowers by guarantying their debts, was acting incident to its fiduciary obligations to government in attempting to collect on defaulted student loan, regardless of whether guaranty agency had yet collected any funds from borrower that it was required to hold for benefit of federal government; accordingly, guaranty agency, as fiduciary to Department of Education (DOE), was not subject to restrictions of Federal Debt Collection and Practices Act (FDCPA). Consumer Credit Protection Act, § §  802 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § §  1692 et seq.;  Higher Education Act of 1965, § § § §  421-501, as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § § § §  1071-1099.  Montgomery v. Educational Credit Management Corp., D.Minn.1999, 238 B.R. 806.

 

 

 20. ---- Corporate entities

 

 

 Pursuant to exception for debt collection efforts of corporate affiliates, corporation whose principal business was not debt collection and which only collected debts for affiliated or related entities was not "debt collector" for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Aubert v. American General Finance, Inc., C.A.7 (Wis.) 1998, 137 F.3d 976.

 

 

 Defendant not-for-profit corporation fell within the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's (FDCPA's) "affiliate exemption" and, thus, did not have to abide by the statute's requirements in its efforts to collect rent arrears from hotel tenants, where defendant owned all shares of the general partner of the New York limited partnership that owned hotel, so that defendant exerted corporate control over hotel, defendant managed only the hotel and not any other hotel or residence, and debt collection was not "the" principal business of defendant, which also obtained charitable grants and, in the hotel itself, was responsible for residence relations, maintenance, security, providing job training and development to residents, and coordinating social events and community services, as well as billing residents and collecting rents. Backuswalcott v. Common Ground Community HDFC, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2000, 104 F.Supp.2d 363.

 

 

 Property management company which was hired by townhome community owners' association to manage community did not operate business with principal purpose of collection of debts, and thus was not a "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); management company performed an number of services unrelated to collecting debts, and less than three percent of its total operations were devoted to the collection of assessments and past due accounts.  Alexander v. Omega Management, Inc., D.Minn.1999, 67 F.Supp.2d 1052.

 

 

 Corporate affiliate of creditor fell within in-house exemption to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where affiliate did not collect debts for unaffiliated entities and affiliate's principal business was not collection of debts.  Pavone v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., S.D.Cal.1997, 60 F.Supp.2d 1040, affirmed 172 F.3d 876.

 

 

 Company hired to print and mail dunning letters for debt collection agency was not "debt collector" within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); company did not collect money from debtors, company's own name and address were not included in letters, company did not provide follow-up collection services such as telephoning debtors, company was paid on per-copy basis and its fees were not contingent on amount of money its clients actually collected, and company had no relationship with debtors' creditors, even though significant portion of company's business was devoted to generating and mailing debt collection letters.  Laubach v. Arrow Service Bureau, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 987 F.Supp. 625.

 

 

 Parent corporations were "debt collectors" under par. (6) of this section and were thus liable for all violations of this subchapter committed by local subsidiaries, even though only the local companies performed the sort of pressure tactics that are commonly thought of as debt collection activity, where all the companies constituted a single entity engaged in debt collection services, parent companies directed debtor accounts to the local agencies for collection services and parent companies provided other essential support services.  U.S. v. ACB Sales & Service, Inc., D.C.Ariz.1984, 590 F.Supp. 561.

 

 

 In view of fact that corporation could act only through its debt collection agents, such corporation, which exercised control over the agents despite fact that agreement referred to them as "independent contractors," could be held liable for agents' violations of this subchapter.  West v. Costen, W.D.Va.1983, 558 F.Supp. 564.

 

 

 Creditor's subsidiary was not "debt collector" for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act;  in its capacity as debt collector, subsidiary collected debts only for its corporate affiliate and subsidiary's principal business was not collection of debts.  Phillips v. Periodical Publishers' Service Bureau, Inc., S.C.1989, 388 S.E.2d 787, 300 S.C. 444.

 

 

 21. ---- Employees

 

 

 Allegation of creditor's employee that she was known by debtors to be employee of creditor was sufficient to state affirmative defense for purposes of debtor's motion to strike under section of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act exempting officer or employee of creditor from liability, although debtor had received debt notices appearing to come from third parties, and exemption did not apply to creditors that use name other than their own.  Hardin v. Folger, W.D.N.Y.1988, 704 F.Supp. 355.

 

 

 Complaint filed by writers of insufficient funds checks failed to state claim against administrator of county check clearing house under this subchapter, since administrator was not included as a debt collector under the definitions of this section and was excluded because he was admittedly an officer or employee of state.  Gary v. Spires, D.C.S.C.1979, 473 F.Supp. 878.

 

 

 Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act did not prohibit employee of mirror installation company from calling wife of actual debtor to recover debts due to installation company;  Act applied to debts due to third-party creditors. Sterling Mirror of Maryland, Inc. v. Gordon, D.C.1993, 619 A.2d 64.

 

 

 22. ---- Media

 

 

 Magazine that contracted with agency for collection of debt allegedly owed by consumer was not "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Howe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 686 F.Supp. 461.

 

 

 Sender of microwave television signals, which sent letters, first through its attorney, then through its general manager, directly attempting to collect money allegedly owed to it by individuals who allegedly received the microwave signals illegally without paying, was not a "debt collector" within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 802 et seq., as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §  1692 et seq., and thus was not subject to the Act.  Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems, Cal.App. 3 Dist.1986, 231 Cal.Rptr. 113, 179 Cal.App.3d 408, review denied.

 

 

 23. ---- Judicial entities

 

 

 Debt arising from forfeiture on criminal bail bond posted by bonding company and insured by insurer was "incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation," and thus, bonding company was not "debt collector," to whom provisions of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) applied;  debt, although owed to insurer, was originated by bonding company and Florida law provided that bail bondsman receives collateral security in his fiduciary capacity.  Buckman v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, S.D.Fla.1996, 924 F.Supp. 1156, affirmed 115 F.3d 892.

 

 

 Constable alleged to have threatened and coerced plaintiff into signing agreement admitting liability and agreeing to pay debt in full did not fit within definition of debt collector under this section, since constable's principal business purpose was not collection of debts, alleged actions of constable appeared to be outside of his ordinary activities as constable even if that position could qualify as business within meaning of this section, and constable was not a creditor.  Horne v. Farrell, M.D.Pa.1983, 560 F.Supp. 219.

 

 

 Activities of the Landlord and Tenant Officer of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, acting on behalf of landlords, in sending notices of lease terminations to tenants who allegedly were delinquent in rental payments, charging tenants fees for that service, collecting rental payments for landlord, and sending, after notices failed to generate payment of delinquent rent, letters restating the amount of rent due, noting date upon which Officer was instructed to initiate eviction proceedings, and providing telephone number through which any questions concerning matter could be resolved, did not violate this subchapter as those activities were authorized by the President Judge of Municipal Court and as such did constitute an official action and were thus exempt from this subchapter.  Heredia v. Green, E.D.Pa.1980, 504 F.Supp. 896, affirmed 667 F.2d 392.

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) did not apply to judgment creditor who was attempting to determine extent of debtors' assets where creditor's principal business was not debt collection, and, thus, FDCPA could not form basis of conviction for harassment.  State v. Long, N.J.Super.L.1993, 630 A.2d 430, 266 N.J.Super. 716.

 

 

 23A. ---- Repossessors

 

 

 Company in business of repossessing vehicles did not constitute "debt collector" within meaning of Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) and Florida consumer collection practices statute, in absence of any evidence that company contacted debtors by any means or that debt was assigned to company. Seibel v. Society Lease, Inc., M.D.Fla.1997, 969 F.Supp. 713.

 

 

 23B. ---- Service providers

 

 

 Local telephone service provider was not "debt collector" for purposes of customer's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim based on local provider's efforts to collect telephone charges incurred through use of information or long-distance providers, given that, pursuant to contracts with information and long-distance providers, local provider acquired debts resulting from calls using such services when calls were placed and thus before debts were in default.  Whitaker v. Ameritech Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1997, 129 F.3d 952, rehearing denied.

 

 

 24. Official duties

 

 

 "Government actor" exemption to Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) applies only to individual government official or employee who collects debts as part of government employment responsibilities.  Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., C.A.9 (Or.) 1996, 94 F.3d 1260, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2484, 521 U.S. 1106, 138 L.Ed.2d 992,certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2496, 521 U.S. 1111, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003.

 

 

 Activities of landlord and tenant officer of the Philadelphia municipal court in serving upon tenants, at request of landlord, copies of document headed "Municipal Court Notice of Termination of Lease," which demanded full payment of all fees, late charges, and unpaid rent within five days, stating that eviction proceedings would be instituted if payment was not received within stated time, and in charging tenants allegedly "unauthorized" fees for such service constituted official activities and were thus excluded from proscriptions of this subchapter.  Heredia v. Green, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1981, 667 F.2d 392.

 

 

 25. Transactions

 

 

 Debtors' obligation to pay dues for services of homeowners association based on covenant running with their property constituted "transaction" within meaning of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Thies v. Law Offices of William A. Wyman, S.D.Cal.1997, 969 F.Supp. 604.

 

 

image002.gifv:shapes= "_x0000_i1026">

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED

TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE

CHAPTER 41--CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

SUBCHAPTER V--DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

 

        .  No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.       

 

Current through P.L. 107-48, approved 10-12-01

 

 

§  1692b. Acquisition of location information

 

 

 

 Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall--

 

  (1) identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer;

 

  (2) not state that such consumer owes any debt;

 

  (3) not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such  person now has correct or complete location information;

 

  (4) not communicate by post card;

 

  (5) not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt;  and

 

  (6) after the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with regard to the subject debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, not communicate with any person other than that attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to communication from the debt collector.

 

 

 

CREDIT(S)

 

1997 Main Volume

 

 

(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VIII, §  804, as added Pub.L. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 876.)

 

 

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

 

 

 

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

 

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

 

 

 1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1962.

 

 

 1977 Acts. Senate Report No. 95-382, see 1977 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1695.

 

 

 

 

AMERICAN LAW REPORTS

 

 

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes prohibiting abusive or coercive debt collection practices. 87 ALR3d 786

 

 

LIBRARY REFERENCES

 

Administrative Law

 

 

Limitations on communications, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3514.

 

 

American Digest System

 

 

Consumer Protection 10.

 

 

Encyclopedias

 

 

C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition §  237.

 

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Consumer and Borrower Protection § §  194, 203

 

 Actionable Practices in Debt Collection, 18 Am Jur Proof of Facts, p. 59

 

 Action for Harassment of Debtor, 16 Am Jur Trials, p. 619

 

 

Texts and Treatises

 

 

Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § §  41.3, 61.4, 61.7  (Robert L. Haig ed.) (West Group & ABA 1998).

 

 7 Fed. Proc. L Ed Consumer Credit Protection § §  15:67, 68

 

 Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases

 

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED

TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE

CHAPTER 41--CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

SUBCHAPTER V--DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

 

        .  No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.       

 

Current through P.L. 107-48, approved 10-12-01

 

 

§  1692c. Communication in connection with debt collection

 

 

 

 

(a) Communication with the consumer generally

 

 

 Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt--

 

  (1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.  In the absence of knowledge of  circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o'clock antimeridian and before 9 o'clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer's location;

 

  (2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer;  or

 

  (3) at the consumer's place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer's employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.

 

 

(b) Communication with third parties

 

 

 Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

 

 

(c) Ceasing communication

 

 

 If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except--

 

  (1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being terminated;

 

  (2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor;  or

 

  (3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.

 

 

If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.

 

 

(d) "Consumer" defined

 

 

 For the purpose of this section, the term "consumer" includes the consumer's spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.

 

 

 

CREDIT(S)

 

1997 Main Volume

 

 

(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VIII, §  805, as added Pub.L. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 876.)

 

 

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

 

 

 

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

 

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

 

 

 1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1962.

 

 

 1977 Acts. Senate Report No. 95-382, see 1977 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1695.

 

 

 

 

AMERICAN LAW REPORTS

 

 

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes prohibiting abusive or coercive debt collection practices. 87 ALR3d 786

 

 

LIBRARY REFERENCES

 

Administrative Law

 

 

Limitations on communications, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3514.

 

 

American Digest System

 

 

Consumer Protection 10.

 

 

Encyclopedias

 

 

C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition §  237.

 

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Consumer and Borrower Protection § §  194, 204

 

 Actionable Practices in Debt Collection, 18 Am Jur Proof of Facts, p. 59

 

 Action for Harassment of Debtor, 16 Am Jur Trials, p. 619

 

 

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

 

 

Acceleration notices and demand letters.  Manuel H. Newburger, 47 Consumer Fin.L.Q.Rep. 338 (1993).

 

 

Texts and Treatises

 

 

Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § §  41.3, 61.4, 61.7 (Robert L. Haig ed.) (West Group & ABA 1998).

 

 7 Fed. Proc. L Ed Consumer Credit Protection § §  15:67, 68, 74

 

 Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases

 

 

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

Ceasing communications 8

   Purpose 1

Representation by attorney 2-5

                Representation by attorney - Generally 2

                Representation by attorney - Separate accounts 4

                Representation by attorney - Specific communications 5

                Representation by attorney - Without knowledge of representation 3

Separate accounts 4

Specific communications 5

Third party 6

Time or place of communication 7

Without knowledge of representation 3

  

 1. Purpose

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §  1692c(a)(2) [Consumer Credit Protection Act, §  805(a)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §  1692c(a)(2)], which prohibits debt collector from communicating with debtor about debt after debt collector knows that debtor is represented by attorney with respect to debt, was designed to prevent repeated phone calls and letters directed to debtor after debt collector knows that person to be represented by attorney.  Bieber v. Associated Collection Services, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 631 F.Supp. 1410.

 

 

 2. Representation by attorney--Generally

 

 

 Out-of-state attorney, in his capacity as debt collector retained to assist in recovering on dishonored check, did not threaten to take legal action which he could not take, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), merely by failing to reveal in his collection letter that he was not licensed to practice in state; letter clearly revealed that, "[i]f legal action is taken and a lawsuit is filed, it will be handled by an attorney within your state." O'Connor v. Check Rite, Ltd., D.Colo.1997, 973 F.Supp. 1010.

 

 

 Section of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) requiring debt collector to "send the consumer" a written debt validation notice had to be interpreted in manner consistent with separate FDCPA provision, which prohibited debt collector from communicating directly with debtor if it knew that debtor was represented by attorney, so as to permit debtor collector to send validation notice to debtor's attorney when it knew of representation. Blum v. Fisher and Fisher, N.D.Ill.1997, 961 F.Supp. 1218.

 

 

 Debt collector, by contacting debtor by mail five days after learning that she was being represented by attorney, clearly violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);  debt collector did not contend that debtor's attorney failed to respond to any of its communications during relevant period. Herbert v. Monterey Financial Services, Inc., D.Conn.1994, 863 F.Supp. 76.

 

 

 Debt collector, president of which knew that consumer was represented by attorney when collection notices were sent to her, violated this subchapter by corresponding with consumer while she was represented by counsel in absence of any evidence that consumer, her counsel or any court agreed to permit direct communication with consumer.  Harvey v. United Adjusters, D.C.Or.1981, 509 F.Supp. 1218.

 

 

 Chapter 13 debtor failed to establish that legal services plan, which filed debtor's bankruptcy petition, was retained by debtor with respect to specified debt, prior to debt collector's communication with debtor;  therefore, debtor failed to establish that debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provision prohibiting unauthorized communications with debtor if debt collector knows that debtor has legal representation with respect to the debt.  Hubbard v. National Bond and Collection Associates, Inc., D.Del.1991, 126 B.R. 422, affirmed 947 F.2d 935.

 

 

 3. ---- Without knowledge of representation

 

 

 Debt collector did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by communicating directly with consumer, even though consumer had retained counsel to help him dispute debt being collected, where debt collector had no knowledge that consumer was represented by counsel "with respect to such debt." Graziano v. Harrison, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 950 F.2d 107.

 

 

 Debt collection notices that debt collector sent directly to consumers in July, August, and September 1992 did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provision prohibiting communication with consumer if debt collector knows consumer is represented by attorney "with respect to such debt," where it was shown that collector first learned that consumers were represented by counsel with respect to debt at issue after October 27, 1992.  Robinson v. Transworld Systems, Inc., N.D.N.Y.1995, 876 F.Supp. 385.

 

 

 4. ---- Separate accounts

 

 

 Collector did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to cease direct communication with debtor once he was notified that debtor had retained counsel with respect to debt by continuing to send collection notices to the debtor where the subsequent collection notices pertained to different debts as to which collector had not been informed that debtor was retained by counsel.  Graziano v. Harrison, D.N.J.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1269,reversed in part, vacated in part 950 F.2d 107.

 

 

 Dunning notices sent by debt collector after it had received notice from debtor's attorney to communicate only with attorney did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act where they referred to debts other than those which had been assigned to the debt collector at the time of the communication from the attorney, debt collector would not be charged with knowledge that the attorney represented the debtor with respect to debts assigned to the debt collector after the date of the attorney's letter, even though those debts were assigned by the same creditor which assigned the earlier debts.  Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., C.D.Cal.1991, 759 F.Supp. 1456.

 

 

 5. ---- Specific communications

 

 

 Telephone call made by debt collector's employee, allegedly attempting to collect debt by calling debtor after he had given notice not to call again and after debt collector had been notified that debtor was represented by counsel on all his debts, was not violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), as call was result of bona fide error;  debtor's account was miscoded accidentally in debt collector's computer, notwithstanding maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such error.  Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., S.D.Ohio 1996, 911 F.Supp. 290, affirmed 135 F.3d 389.

 

 

 Evidence established that debt collection agency had knowledge of fact that debtor was represented by attorney when it sent letter to debtor, and thus that agency was in technical violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in bypassing attorney;  attorney called agency after criminal action against debtor was concluded and made offer on behalf of debtor to settle matter. Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., D.S.D.1990, 738 F.Supp. 334.

 

 

 Single additional question of debt collector, after debtor advised it to contact her attorney, as to whether debtors were planning to file petition in bankruptcy, was not so extensive as to have been kind of additional "communication" prohibited after debt collector knows that debtor is represented by attorney with respect to debt, nor was question designed to harass or abuse debtors.  Bieber v. Associated Collection Services, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 631 F.Supp. 1410.

 

 

 Debt collector directly communicated with debtors represented by attorney in violation of federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by directing letters to them without acknowledging attorney's representation, though letters were sent to attorney's office.  Clark's Jewelers v. Humble, Kan.App.1991, 823 P.2d 818, 16 Kan.App.2d 366.

 

 

 Sending demand letter directly to debtor after collection agency had been advised that debtor was represented by counsel violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, even though Wyoming statute required that notice be given to drawer of dishonored check.  Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., Wyo.1989, 778 P.2d 93.

 

 

 6. Third party

 

 

 Dismissal was appropriate of debtor's claim that debt collector's contacts and attempted contacts with supplemental cardholders and with debtor's neighbors were attempts to collect debt after notice not to do so, in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);  claim was outside pleadings, and any attempt to amend after close of debtor's evidence to plead claim was unfairly prejudicial to debt collector, which had not discovered nor prepared with intention of trying claim.  Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., S.D.Ohio 1996, 911 F.Supp. 290, affirmed 135 F.3d 389.

 

 

 Affidavit of consumer's secretary that employee of debt collector called consumer's office and spoke to secretary in connection with collection of consumer's debt established violation of provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibiting improper communication with third parties;  although debt collector's counsel challenged secretary's allegations, debt collector provided no allegation or other evidence contesting secretary's affidavit in any way and bald assertion that affidavit was inaccurate or credible was insufficient to defeat consumer's motion for summary judgment.  Austin v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., D.Conn.1993, 834 F.Supp. 557.

 

 

 Statement by debt collector in second notice indicating that all information obtained in investigation would be used in collection of debt was simply reiteration of required notice in follow-up collection letter, and words "in our investigation" did not threaten improper third-party contact in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., D.Conn.1990, 774 F.Supp. 1404.

 

 

 Letter sent by debt collection agency to federal credit union on which debtor's insufficient funds checks were drawn was not communication with "third party" in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act;  there was no chance that letter was used to embarrass debtor or that invasion of privacy or loss of employment could occur, and agency could reasonably have thought that credit union was at least partly liable for money owed, particularly in view of fact that negligence or mistake by credit union was defense at debtor's criminal trial.  Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., D.S.D.1990, 738 F.Supp. 334.

 

 

 Debtor's mother, who was not obligated to pay any debt, was not a "consumer" within meaning of section 1692a of this title, and, in view of such fact, the mother, who was contacted by debt collector in attempt to collect the debt, was not entitled to recover under this section prohibiting certain third-party contacts.  West v. Costen, W.D.Va.1983, 558 F.Supp. 564.

 

 

 Co-worker's telephone message slip, stating that notice of foreclosure was being served on debtor's wife, failed to show that communication regarding debt owed by debtor was made to third party in violation of this subchapter. Committe v. Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A., D.Vt.1993, 150 F.R.D. 495.

 

 

 Collection letter addressed to consumer at his place of employment under circumstances which were such that reasonable person, in consumer's position, would be humiliated and embarrassed, was a violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §  802, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §  1692, and creditor was liable for any mental and emotional distress, embarrassment and humiliation caused by the letter.  Kleczy v. First Federal Credit Control, Inc., Ohio App.1984, 486 N.E.2d 204, 21 Ohio App.3d 56, 21 O.B.R. 59.

 

 

 7. Time or place of communication

 

 

 Debt collector did not violate provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) regulating its communications with consumer generally, though debt collector had admittedly mailed copy of its letter to consumer at his place of employment, absent any evidence that debt collector knew or had reason to know that consumer's employer prohibited him from receiving such communications at workplace.  Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, E.D.Pa.1996, 926 F.Supp. 521.

 

 

 Debt collection agency's willful and repeated disregard of consumer's clear request to discontinue its attempts to contact consumer at her office constituted direct violation of provision of Fair Debt Collection Act prohibiting debt collector from contacting consumer at time or place known to be inconvenient to consumer.  Austin v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., D.Conn.1993, 834 F.Supp. 557.

 

 

 Government established by preponderance of evidence that collection agency and many of its debt collectors, including some supervisors and managers in regional collection offices, used abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; evidence indicated that telephone calls were made to debtors before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m., that debtors' places of employment were called after agency was told not to do so by debtors or employers, that third parties were contacted about debts without debtors' consent, that racial slurs and obscenities were used in attempting to collect debts, and that collectors falsely represented to debtors that they would be arrested or jailed or that property would be seized or garnished.  U.S. v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., N.D.Tex.1986, 667 F.Supp. 370, affirmed as modified on other grounds 823 F.2d 880.

 

 

 8. Ceasing communications

 

 

 Consumer failed to establish that he had made written request that debt collector cease any further communications, as required for consumer to prevail under section of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibiting further communications following such a written request, based solely on the fact that following such an alleged communication, of which consumer presented no direct written evidence, debt collector had mailed collection letter which specifically referred to this section of the FDCPA.  O'Connor v. Check Rite, Ltd., D.Colo.1997, 973 F.Supp. 1010.

 

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED

TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE

CHAPTER 41--CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

SUBCHAPTER V--DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

 

        .  No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.       

 

Current through P.L. 107-48, approved 10-12-01

 

 

§  1692d. Harassment or abuse

 

 

 

 A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.  Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

 

  (1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.

 

  (2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

 

  (3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts,  except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) of this title.

 

  (4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.

 

  (5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.

 

  (6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity.

 

 

 

CREDIT(S)

 

1997 Main Volume

 

 

(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VIII, §  806, as added Pub.L. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 877.)

 

 

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

 

 

 

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

 

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

 

 

 1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1962.

 

 

 1977 Acts. Senate Report No. 95-382, see 1977 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1695.

 

 

 

 

AMERICAN LAW REPORTS

 

 

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes prohibiting abusive or coercive debt collection practices. 87 ALR3d 786

 

 

LIBRARY REFERENCES

 

Administrative Law

 

 

Prohibited types of conduct by debt collector, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3515.

 

 

American Digest System

 

 

Consumer Protection 10.

 

 

Encyclopedias

 

 

C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition §  237.

 

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Consumer and Borrower Protection § §  194, 205, 206

 

 Actionable Practices in Debt Collection, 18 Am Jur Proof of Facts, p. 59

 

 Action for Harassment of Debtor, 16 Am Jur Trials, p. 619

 

 

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

 

 

Constitutionality of requiring telephone companies to protect their subscribers from telemarketing calls.  James A. Albert, 33 Santa Clara L.Rev. 51 (1993).

 

 

Texts and Treatises

 

 

Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § §  41.3, 61.4, 61.7  (Robert L. Haig ed.) (West Group & ABA 1998).

 

 7 Fed. Proc. L Ed Consumer Credit Protection § §  15:67, 68, 74

 

 Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases

 

 

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

Burden of proof 8

   Civil action 2

Harassment, generally 1

Inconvenience and embarrassment 6

Least sophisticated consumer standards 7

Letters 3

Nonabusive statements encouraging payment 5

Summary judgment 9

Telephone ringing or conversations 4

  

 1. Harassment, generally

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §  1692d [Consumer Credit Protection Act,  §  806, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §  1692d], prohibiting debt collector from engaging in any conduct designed to harass, oppress, or abuse debtor, prohibits debtor's tender sensibilities only from oppressive and outrageous conduct; some inconvenience or embarrassment is natural consequence of debt collection.  Bieber v. Associated Collection Services, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 631 F.Supp. 1410.

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) did not apply to judgment creditor who was attempting to determine extent of debtors' assets where creditor's principal business was not debt collection, and, thus, FDCPA could not form basis of conviction for harassment.  State v. Long, N.J.Super.L.1993, 630 A.2d 430, 266 N.J.Super. 716.

 

 

 Use of alias or "desk name" by individual debt collector who otherwise accurately discloses name of her employer and nature of its business and conceals no more than her real name, does not constitute conduct prohibited by Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §  806(6), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §  1692d(6).  Kleczy v. First Federal Credit Control, Inc., Ohio App.1984, 486 N.E.2d 204, 21 Ohio App.3d 56, 21 O.B.R. 59.

 

 

 2. Civil action

 

 

 Attorney's claim that he would seek attorney's fees and costs if legal action were commenced was neither false nor oppressive and complied with Fair Debt Collection Practices Act;  contract between consumer buyer and seller provided for payment of attorney fees and costs in collection action.  Dorsey v. Morgan, D.Md.1991, 760 F.Supp. 509.

 

 

 Evidence failed to establish that debtors suffered harassment and abuse because of improper discussions by collector, of possibility, and foreseeable consequences of civil action to collect.  Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., D.C.N.D.1981, 505 F.Supp. 864.

 

 

 3. Letters

 

 

 Debt collection agency's letters stating that debtor owed named creditor, that subject amount had not been paid and that unless satisfactory arrangements were made within five days the agency would recommend suit or subsequent action and that last letter was final notice before recommending that creditor to turn account over to its lawyer and that although it might cause embarrassment and inconvenience such would be done if balance was not paid within five days did not fall within Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's proscription on use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the reader.  Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 760 F.2d 1168.

 

 

 Debt collection agency's letters stating that unless satisfactory arrangements were made within five days the agency would recommend suit and subsequent action and recommend giving account to attorney for legal action and stating that although legal proceedings might cause embarrassment, inconvenience and further expense such would be recommended if entire balance were not paid did not constitute harassment or abuse in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 760 F.2d 1168.

 

 

 Reference in second collection notice from debt collector giving debtor "THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE THIS MATTER IN A FRIENDLY MANNER," following first notice in which debt collector stated it would resort to all approved means to collect debt, did not imply that debt collector would resort to unfriendly methods including violence if friendly methods did not succeed, in violation of provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibiting harassing, oppressing, or abusive conduct in connection with collection of a debt. Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., D.Conn.1990, 774 F.Supp. 1404.

 

 

 There was no harassment or abuse of debtor by debt collector, even though first collection letter contained a threat to file suit, where all other letters were reserved and respectful in tone.  Graziano v. Harrison, D.N.J.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1269,reversed in part, vacated in part 950 F.2d 107.

 

 

 Even if all of the alleged 48 letters sent to debtor by debt collector over a period of eight months referred to the same debt, the mailing of six letters per month would not be "harassing."  Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., C.D.Cal.1991, 759 F.Supp. 1456.

 

 

 Letter from debt collection agency threatening civil suit if debtor did not pay debt did not amount to harassing, oppressive, or abusive conduct in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act where threat involved action that could lawfully be taken and was in fact carried out.  Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., D.S.D.1990, 738 F.Supp. 334.

 

 

 Letter which was sent by debt collector to consumer and which implied that consumer removed her head when she received letters from collector, that she ignored her mail and her bills, and that she lacked common sense to handle her financial matters properly, when in fact she had called collector in response to earlier letter and her call had not been returned, violated this section, which prohibits a debt collector from engaging in any conduct that harasses or abuses any person in connection with collection of debt.  Harvey v. United Adjusters, D.C.Or.1981, 509 F.Supp. 1218.

 

 

 Letter to plaintiff from defendant collection agency violated harassment provision of this subchapter, where the letter had the natural and intended consequence of harassing, oppressing, and abusing the recipient, where the tone of the letter was one of intimidation and was intended as such in order to effect a collection, and where the threat of an investigation and resulting embarrassment to the alleged debtor was clear.  Rutyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc., N.D.Ill.1979, 478 F.Supp. 980.

 

 

 Notices sent by collection bureau to debtor did not "harass" or "abuse" debtor under this subchapter, where notices did not continually speak to criminal prosecution until third week, topic of criminal sanctions was not initially and persistently mentioned, issuance of bad checks was misdemeanor under state law, and language used was not wrongful in speech, coarsely disparaging, or maligning.  In re Scrimpsher, Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1982, 17 B.R. 999.

 

 

 4. Telephone ringing or conversations

 

 

 Debtors stated claim under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) section proscribing conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass or oppress any person;  debtors testified that debt collector's agent was intimidating and threatening in her phone conversations with debtors, debtor described threats of garnishment accompanied by demands for overnight sending of payments, and agent called debtor at work after debtor had twice requested that she not be phoned at her place of employment.  Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 15 F.3d 1507.

 

 

 Use of desk name, an alias, by debt collector's employee, did not violate this section prohibiting placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of caller's identity.  Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., N.D.Ga.1982, 548 F.Supp. 591, on reconsideration 555 F.Supp. 1005.

 

 

 Collector's immediately recalling debtor after debtor hung up constituted harassment.  Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., D.C.N.D.1981, 505 F.Supp. 864.

 

 

 5. Nonabusive statements encouraging payment

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act section which prohibits engaging in conduct natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of debt does not preclude debt collectors from making nonabusive statements designed to encourage voluntary payment. Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., D.Del.1991, 754 F.Supp. 383.

 

 

 6. Inconvenience and embarrassment

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act section which prohibits engaging in conduct natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of debt prohibits only oppressive and outrageous conduct;  it is not intended to shield even least sophisticated recipients of debt collection activities from inconvenience and embarrassment that are natural consequences of debt collection.  Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., D.Del.1991, 754 F.Supp. 383.

 

 

 7. Least sophisticated consumer standard

 

 

 The "least sophisticated consumer" standard is not precisely applicable to claims of harassment or abuse in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, but the consumer protective purposes of the Act requires adoption of an analogous standard in harassment and abuse cases and such claim should be viewed from the prospective of a consumer whose circumstances make him relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression or abuse.  Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 760 F.2d 1168.

 

 

 8. Burden of proof

 

 

 Consumer, who alleged that debt collector violated this section by making abusive and obscene phone calls to her, failed to meet her burden of proving that such phone calls were made by collector.  Harvey v. United Adjusters, D.C.Or.1981, 509 F.Supp. 1218.

 

 

 9. Summary judgment

 

 

 Material fact issue existed whether debt collection agency, which sent letters stating that it would recommend legal action unless satisfactory arrangements were made within five days, ever intended to recommend legal action against debtor, precluding summary judgment on claim that agency violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by threatening to take action not intended to be taken.  Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 760 F.2d 1168.

 

 

 In action against debt collector for violation of this subchapter, summary judgment for either party was precluded by issue of whether defendant's employee's statements to debtor violated this subchapter on theory that they would have deceived unsophisticated listener to believe that defendant was acting as credit bureau rather than debt collector.  Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., N.D.Ga.1982, 548 F.Supp. 591, on reconsideration 555 F.Supp. 1005.

 

 

 

 

 

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED

TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE

CHAPTER 41--CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

SUBCHAPTER V--DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

 

        .  No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.       

 

Current through P.L. 107-48, approved 10-12-01

 

 

§  1692e. False or misleading representations

See Becker case Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002)

 

 

 

 A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.  Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

 

  (1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

 

  (2) The false representation of--

 

   (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt;  or

 

   (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

 

  (3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.

 

  (4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.

 

  (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

 

  (6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to--

 

   (A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt;  or

 

   (B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this subchapter.

 

  (7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

 

  (8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

 

  (9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or  is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.

 

  (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

 

  (11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initialcommunication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.

 

  (12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value.

 

  (13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.

 

  (14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector's business, company, or organization.

 

  (15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal process forms or do not require action by the consumer.

 

  (16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 1681a(f) of this title.

 

 

 

CREDIT(S)

 

1997 Main Volume

 

 

(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VIII, §  807, as added Pub.L. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 877, and amended Pub.L. 104-208, Title II, §  2305(a), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-425.)

 

 

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

 

 

 

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

 

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

 

 

 1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1962.

 

 

 1977 Acts. Senate Report No. 95-382, see 1977 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1695.

 

 

Amendments

 

 

 1996 Amendments. Par. (11).  Pub.L. 104-208, §  2305(a), amended par. (11) generally.  Prior to amendment, par. (11) read as follows:  "Except as otherwise provided for communications to acquire location information under section 1692b of this title, the failure to disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose."

 

 

Effective and Applicability Provisions

 

 

 1996 Acts. Section 2305(b) of Pub.L. 104-208 provided that:  "The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending par. (11) of this section] shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 30, 1996] and shall apply to all communications made after that date of enactment [Sept. 30, 1996]."

 

 

 

 

LIBRARY REFERENCES

 

Administrative Law

 

 

Debt collection practices, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3511.

 

Prohibited types of conduct by debt collector, see West's Federal Administrative Practice §  3515.

 

 

American Digest System

 

 

Consumer Protection 10.

 

 

Encyclopedias

 

 

C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition §  237.

 

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Consumer and Borrower Protection § §  194, 204, 207- 214

 

 Actionable Practices in Debt Collection, 18 Am Jur Proof of Facts, p. 59

 

 Collection Practice, 12 Am Jur Trials, p. 193

 

 

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

 

 

Acceleration notices and demand letters.  Manuel H. Newburger, 47 Consumer Fin.L.Q.Rep. 338 (1993).

 

 

Texts and Treatises

 

 

Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts § §  41.3, 61.4, 61.7  (Robert L. Haig ed.) (West Group & ABA 1998).

 

 7 Fed. Proc. L Ed Consumer Credit Protection § §  15:67, 68, 70, 74, 76

 

 Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases

 

 

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

Amount of debt 17

Communications 19

   Construction 1

Credit reporting 16

Deceptive practices 10

Declaratory judgment 28

Definitions 2

Demanding payment from wrong individuals 23

Dunning letters 24

Employer contacts 8

Failure to disclose attempt to collect debt 22

Failure to state a claim 30

Garnishment, attachment, execution, or foreclosure 14

Government action 13

Identification of creditor or collector 15

Jeopardy of account 3

Least sophisticated consumer standard 20

Legal proceedings 6

Legal status of debt, misleading statements 11a

Limitations 29

Litigation representation 12

Mass mailing 25

Misleading statements 11-16

                Misleading statements - Generally 11

                Misleading statements - Credit reporting 16

                Misleading statements - Garnishment, attachment, execution, or foreclosure      14

                Misleading statements - Government action 13

                Misleading statements - Identification of creditor or collector 15

                Misleading statements - Legal status of debt 11a

                Misleading statements - Litigation representation 12

Reasonable consumer standard 18

Status of collector 4

Summary judgment 27

Threats 5-9

                Threats - Generally 5

                Threats - Employer contacts 8

                Threats - Legal proceedings 6

                Threats - Unintended actions 7

                Threats - Unspecified future actions 9

Transfer of accounts 26

Unintended actions 7

Unsophisticated consumer standard 21

Unspecified future actions 9

   Weight and conclusiveness of administrative interpretations 31

Weight and sufficiency of evidence 32

  

 1. Construction

 

 

 Doctrine of legislative reenactment did not incorporate into Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) opinion or Court of Appeals decision, where Congress simply repealed attorney exemption provision of FDCPA and did not reenact entire statute.  Dutton v. Wolpoff and Abramson, C.A.3 (Del.) 1993, 5 F.3d 649.

 

 

 2. Definitions

 

 

 For purposes of prohibition in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) against representations by debt collectors that they are connected with governmental entity, "affiliate" is defined as signifying condition of being united and "vouch" is defined as to give personal assurance or service as guarantee.  Gammon v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 27 F.3d 1254, on remand 162 F.R.D. 313.

 

 

 3. Jeopardy of account

 

 

 Prominent use of "credit bureau" in letters of corporation engaged as both consumer reporting agency and debt collector, with less noticeable indication that letters originated in collection department, violated this section proscribing use of any deceptive means to attempt to collect debt, since unsophisticated debtor would tend to believe that she was directly dealing with credit bureau and could reasonably perceive threat to her credit rating and, since collection division did not as matter of course inform consumer reporting division of results of attempts to collect debts and did not intend to pass along information concerning debtor, letters were deceptive.  Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., N.D.Ga.1982, 548 F.Supp. 591, on reconsideration 555 F.Supp. 1005.

 

 

 Notice which was sent by collector to debtor and which warned that failure to pay would place account in jeopardy without stating any adverse consequences of the jeopardy did not make a false representation in violation of this section.  Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., D.C.N.D.1981, 505 F.Supp. 864.

 

 

 4. Status of collector

 

 

 Allegation in debt collection agency's state court complaint against writer of bad checks, that agency was "subrogated" to payee's rights, when in fact agency was not, gave a false impression as to the legal status agency enjoyed under Illinois law, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2000, 233 F.3d 469.

 

 

 Debt collector, who uses mass-produced collection letter using letterhead and facsimile signature of lawyer who is not actually participating in collection process, violates FDCPA.  Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, C.A.5 (La.) 1997, 103 F.3d 1232.

 

 

 Computer-generated debt collection form letters bearing name and facsimile of signature of attorney who did not review collection letter or file of debtor to whom letters were sent violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provision prohibiting false representation or implication that communication is from attorney;  use of attorney's letterhead and signature on collection letters was sufficient to give least sophisticated consumer impression that letters were communications from attorney and this impression was false and misleading because attorney played virtually no day-to-day role in debt collection process.  Clomon v. Jackson, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1993, 988 F.2d 1314.

 

 

 Language in collection agency's letters to effect that it was a "licensed collection agency and any information obtained from you will be used for the purpose of collecting this debt" did not misrepresent that agency was affiliated with the state of Ohio.  Smith v. Transworld Systems, Inc., C.A.6 (Ohio) 1992, 953 F.2d 1025.

 

 

 Debt collector, by identifying itself as "Collections Department, Credit Bureau of Baton Rouge," did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's (FDCPA) prohibition against using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation" in connection with collection of debt;  there was affiliation between two entities, debt collector did in fact operate credit bureau's collections department, collector did not represent that it was consumer reporting agency, and collector did not represent that it was employed by credit bureau.  McKenzie v. E.A. Uffman & Associates, Inc., M.D.La.1996, 943 F.Supp. 630,reversed 119 F.3d 358.

 

 

 Seller and lessor of home appliances, which did business under name other than its incorporated name, did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by collecting debt from customer under its business name where it had consistently dealt with customers since beginning of credit relationship at issue under such name.  Dickenson v. Townside T.V. & Appliance, Inc., S.D.W.Va.1990, 770 F.Supp. 1122.

 

 

 Generally, validation notice sent by debt collection agency to debtor will comport with requirements of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act if content of notice complies with literal terms of statute;  at minimum, notice must be actually included with either initial communication or within five days of initial communication and, if included, must contain all information dictated by statute.  Smith v. Financial Collection Agencies, D.Del.1991, 770 F.Supp. 232.

 

 

 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits practice whereby debt collectors misrepresent that they are credit bureaus.  Anthes v. Transworld Systems, Inc., D.Del.1991, 765 F.Supp. 162.

 

 

 Debt collector's notice to consumer did not violate this section, which provides that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with collection of any debt, where notice did not misrepresent collector's status but merely stated that persons who paid their bills would retain a good credit rating.  Harvey v. United Adjusters, D.C.Or.1981, 509 F.Supp. 1218.

 

 

 5. Threats--Generally

 

 

 Collection agency's notice to debtor stating that its records showed amount owing, that failure to pay may adversely affect debtor's credit, and that notice was sent by agency in attempt to collect debt was not threat to take action that could not legally be taken in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) as body of notice was informational and least sophisticated debtor would construe notice as prudential reminder, not as threat to take action.  Wade v. Regional Credit Ass'n, C.A.9 (Idaho) 1996, 87 F.3d 1098.

 

 

 Cable television companies were not seeking to collect a "debt" within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when they demanded monetary compensation in settlement of asserted legal claims against persons suspected of having illegally received microwave television signals, considering that no offer or extension of credit was asserted in demand letter which represented a settlement offer of potential tort liability.  Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1163.

 

 

 Debt collector's dunning letters, which contained phrases "FAILURE TO PAY IN FULL WHEN NOTIFIED WILL BE JUST CAUSE TO PLACE THIS ITEM ON YOUR CREDIT REPORT" and "ACCORDING TO LAW, [THE NEGATIVE COMMENT] MAY BE REPORTED FOR SEVEN YEARS," could have been interpreted to mean that immediate payment was required for debtors to avoid suffering consequences for seven years; thus, letters both contradicted validation notices and constituted false threat in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Creighton v. Emporia Credit Service, Inc., E.D.Va.1997, 981 F.Supp. 411.

 

 

 Debt collector violated provision of federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibiting any threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken by sending letter to consumer demanding payment of collection costs imposed by creditor which were prohibited by state law;  debt collector could not take legal action on this amount. Patzka v. Viterbo College, W.D.Wis.1996, 917 F.Supp. 654.

 

 

 Debt collector which was not licensed in state of Connecticut, as required under Connecticut's Consumer Collection Agency Act, violated provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibiting threatening taking of action that legally cannot be taken when it attempted to collect debt in Connecticut by sending notices demanding payment and stating that it intended to use all means at its disposal to collect and to enforce debt.  Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., D.Conn.1990, 774 F.Supp. 1404.

 

 

 6. ---- Legal proceedings

 

 

 Debt collection notices violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by threatening legal action when debt collectors did not intend to file suit; statements that accounts would be transferred to attorney if unpaid by deadline and that debtor's attorney would want to be paid had effect of threatening litigation even though collectors knew that neither creditor nor creditor's attorney would file lawsuits against debtors.  United States v. National Financial Services, Inc., C.A.4 (Md.) 1996, 98 F.3d 131.

 

 

 Debtors stated claim under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) section proscribing false, deceptive or misleading representations, including threat to take any action that is not intended to be taken;  debtor was told by one agent of debt collector that full balance of her debt was due and that collector would proceed with garnishment, debtor was later contacted by another agent who asked her to pay the regular monthly charge of $100 within a week and warned her to pay that amount each month thereafter, although debtor complied with request, agent called again and demanded increased payment and once again threatened garnishment, and collector's lawyer filed garnishment without a promised prior contact with debtors' lawyer.  Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 15 F.3d 1507.

 

 

 Dunning letter which falsely stated that creditor had given debt collection agency authority to initiate legal proceedings against debtor and which implied that commencement of legal proceedings was imminent when, in fact, this was not case, was threat to take action not intended to be taken, which violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's prohibition against use of false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with collection of debt, since least sophisticated consumer would interpret it to mean that legal action was authorized, likely, and imminent.  Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1993, 6 F.3d 60.

 

 

 Collection letter sent by collection agency to debtor did not convey false sense of urgency or threaten to take action that could not legally be taken or that was not intended to be taken, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where letter suggested that debtor take steps to "voluntarily settle" his overdue account and that his "continuing failure to pay [was] now in the hands of the [creditor]," least sophisticated consumer would not interpret notice as indication that legal action was imminent and, even if language did threaten to take legal action, debtor did not prove agency's lack of ability or intent to take such action.  Powell v. Computer Credit, Inc., S.D.Ohio 1997, 975 F.Supp. 1034, affirmed.

 

 

 Attorney and law firm did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, by threatening legal action that could not be legally taken or attempting to mislead debtor so as to collect debt, when attorney sent collection letters to debtor who resided in state in which attorney was not licensed to practice, inasmuch as attorney and law firm, at a minimum, could have retained local counsel if they chose to pursue collection in debtor's state and could legally take action against debtor in his state to collect debt.  Sturdevant v. Thomas E. Jolas, P.C., W.D.Wis.1996, 942 F.Supp. 426.

 

 

 Threats to take legal action or to report debtor to credit agencies are not actionable under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), unless action threatened cannot legally be taken, is not intended to be taken, or involves the communication of false information.  Whayne v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., D.Kan.1996, 915 F.Supp. 1143.

 

 

 Debt collection agency and attorney falsely threatened in demand letter to file collection litigation in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where agency and attorney could not legally have filed litigation against debtor within 30-day time period indicated in demand letter since, under agency's agreement with creditor, agency had to obtain written permission from creditor prior to filing litigation against debtors, and where creditor's granting of permission to sue under agreement would be on 65% contingency assignment in agency's own name, but such assignment would be in violation of New Mexico law.  Russey v. Rankin, D.N.M.1995, 911 F.Supp. 1449.

 

 

 Because debt collector was prohibited by Fair Debt Collection Practices Act  (FDCPA) venue provision from filing action seeking to collect debt in county in which debtor did not reside and in which contract was not signed, debt collector's threat to file in that county violated FDCPA provision barring false, deceptive and misleading practices including making of threat to do anything that may not legally be done.  Wiener v. Bloomfield, S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 771.

 

 

 Language in collection letter which could be interpreted as requiring that debt be paid within five days to avoid "further action" could be interpreted by least sophisticated consumer as threat to commence legal action, of kind which debt collector allegedly did not have authority to undertake;  accordingly, language in letter would support claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for debt collector's alleged improper threats to take action which it had no intention to take.  Tsenes v. Trans-Continental Credit and Collection Corp., E.D.N.Y.1995, 892 F.Supp. 461.

 

 

 Letter stating it was formal notice to debtor that debt collector was preparing Power of Attorney to file suit at local Justice of the Peace Court did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by threatening to take action that could not legally be taken, regardless of Delaware court's future position regarding correctness of Justice of the Peace Court directive governing suits brought in that court by collection agencies.  Higgins v. Capitol Credit Services, Inc., D.Del.1991, 762 F.Supp. 1128.

 

 

 Even under least sophisticated debtor standard, collection agency's mere threat to institute lawsuit in and of itself does not constitute harassive, oppressive, or abusive conduct which would violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., D.Del.1991, 754 F.Supp. 383.

 

 

 In light of statement, in red ink, that failure to respond would result in referral to creditor's own legal department for action, debtor was not irrational in concluding that creditor's collection letter threatened inevitable and immediate action against her by legal department when she was unable to make payment.  In re Belile, Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1997, 209 B.R. 658.

 

 

 Debt collection letter could be reasonably interpreted to threaten that law suit would be brought against Chapter 7 debtor if payment in full were not made within one week, and under applicable Pennsylvania law, law suit could not have been filed without 30-day presuit notice;  therefore, dispatch of letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Crossley v. Lieberman, E.D.Pa.1988, 90 B.R. 682, affirmed 868 F.2d 566.

 

 

 7. ---- Unintended actions

 

 

 Credit bureau violated sections of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by threatening action that was not intended to be taken, and by making a false representation;  clear import of language in notice sent to debtor was that some type of legal action already had been and or was about to be initiated and that it could be averted only by payment;  however, alleged debt was under $150, and president of bureau testified that bureau routinely would take no further action on debts under $150, other than "try to contact by phone." Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 886 F.2d 22.

 

 

 Debt collector did not threaten to take action that it did not intend to take, and thus, did not violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibiting debt collector from taking any action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken, even though consumers claimed that debt collector threatened to sue consumers if they did not pay debt;  collector's president testified that collector did refer files on which payment had not been made to it to credit management services office, and indicated that credit office could recommend legal action depending on facts and circumstances of each individual file.  Robinson v. Transworld Systems, Inc., N.D.N.Y.1995, 876 F.Supp. 385.

 

 

 Letter from debt collector threatening to institute suit if payment were not received within ten days violated prohibition of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against threatening action which is not intended to be taken where letter was dated April 28 and the account was not paid until July 27, and no action had been filed.  Graziano v. Harrison, D.N.J.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1269,reversed in part, vacated in part 950 F.2d 107.

 

 

 Evidence did not support debtor's contention that debt collection agency threatened suit against her without intending to follow through, in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, particularly in view of fact that suit was actually brought.